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Abstract
This study analyzes the share price reactions of real estate development and
building/construction materials corporations in relation to FIRB rule changes. It appears
companies as a whole were indifferent to the rule changes; however individual securities
returns were wildly different. These findings suggest that the FIRB rule changes had a
mixed effect on different corporations possibly based on their exposure to the Australian
real estate market.
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I. Introduction
During the past few years, there has been a growing concern about the
affordability of housing in Australia. From 2011 to 2016, Australian property prices have
grown by 35%, Sydney by 57.3% and Melbourne by 50.7% (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 2016), and are often cited as the least affordable in the world (Demographia
2016). Popular Australian media have portrayed the growing number of foreign real
estate investors as the primary reason for the growth in real estate prices (Wong 2017).
These claims are not baseless; diagram 1 shows Chinese investment has grown from 4
billion Australian dollars in 2011 to 24.35 billion in 2015. Specifically, Chinese
investment has increased from 10% of total real estate investment to 25.1% in the same
timeframe. Additionally, per a study by the National Australian Bank, at its peak, foreign
buyers accounted for 15.7% of new home purchases in the third quarter of 2015 and 9%
of total demand for established properties (NAB 2016). These numbers do not include all
the illegal and alternative methods available to overseas investors, underestimating the
figures above. These facts appear to present a correlation between the growth in housing
prices and the increase in foreign investment, especially in Melbourne and Sydney, which
are home to four-fifths of all foreign investment (Gauder Houssard & Orsmond 2014).
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Diagram 1
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However, Chinese investment is not the only cause of Australia’s rapid growth in
housing prices. First, many Australian cities face major supply constraints that boost
prices. Most Australian cities are built along the coast and along mountain ranges, which
restricts the construction of new housing units outward (Richards 2008). Along with
geographic constraints to supply, the country has installed policies to limit the outward
expansion of cities to curtail ‘urban sprawl,’ resulting in boosted prices. In Australian
cities, zoning laws have contributed to inflating housing prices by prescribing certain
tracts of land to be high or low (Kulish, Richards and Gillitzer 2012).
On the demand side, in the 1970’s, Australian housing markets were heavily
regulated. In the mid-1980s, there was a decision to deregulate the housing market
ultimately causing interest rates to lower in the 1990s. The deregulated housing market
and the low-interest rate environment have been some of the many factors behind the
2

increase in domestic Australian housing demand (Stapledon 2016). Accompanied by the
low-interest rates and deregulation, Australia is currently experiencing a migration shift
in its largest cities, boosting major city prices. Structural changes in the economy have
moved away from labor-intensive industrial production towards a centrally located
knowledge-based economy, where the migration is centralized. The changes in the
econommmy has created a migration shift from the urban fringe towards the cities (Yates
2016).
While most Australians place the blame on Chinese buyers, the legislative
framework has modeled the public's concerns by attempting to curtail foreign investment
to keep Australian housing prices lower and push out housing supply. Under Australian
laws, foreign nationals are not allowed to purchase existing dwellings, but rather they
must purchase new dwellings (FIRB Factsheet 2015). With Chinese money still looking
to go abroad to Australia, many residential housing builders have built housing
specifically for Chinese buyers (Wong 2017). The restraints on spending has created a
dichotomy between not only the prices of new dwellings and existing dwellings but also
the purchasers of these homes. Foreign nationals often purchase homes above the average
home price, whereas first-time domestic homebuyers bought homes below the average
home price (Gauder Houssard & Orsmond 2014). Thanks to the pre-existing legislative
framework, this may have pushed out the supply of housing, benefiting Australian
citizens.
The legislative framework for foreign investment relies on on, what sets Australia
apart from other countries, a government body called the Foreign Investment Review

3

Board, otherwise known as the FIRB. The FIRB’s role is to review foreign investments
and prevent any investment that may be against Australia’s national interest (FIRB About
2017). The FIRB evaluates investments in business acquisitions, agribusiness, media
business, commercial and agricultural land, mining tenements, and most importantly, for
the purposes of this study, real estate. The FIRB changes, mentioned above, were
announced on Saturday, May 2, 2015, by Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Treasurer Joe
Hockey while making a joint announcement confirming a raft of changes to the foreign
investments rules that would be implemented on December 1st, 2015. The changes
implemented focused on tightening foreign investment rules already in place. The new
changes included streamlining the process for finding violators by putting detection under
one agency, the Australian Tax Office, and increasing fines and jail time for violators.
More importantly, the new rules implemented fees for new foreign investment
applications. These fees can range from AUD$5,000 to AUD$100,000, depending on the
value of the property (McCullough Robertson 2015).
Overall, with the legislative framework, Australian housing prices have
experienced a dramatic increase during the past decade due to numerous factors.
Endogenous factors include the lack of brownfield and greenfield development areas in
Melbourne and Sydney. The lack of readily available land to develop can lead to a supply
constraint pushing prices up. Exogenously, clear increase in investment abroad,
especially from Chinese nationals, has pushed demand out as well. These developments
mirror other English-speaking countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada, specifically, in such cities as Palo Alto, Los Angeles, New York, London,
and Vancouver. The major difference between other major English speaking developed
4

nations and Australia is the FIRB and the legislative framework that it enforces. This
study will explore the effect of the new FIRB regulatory framework on the Australian
real estate market through an event study of Australian public equities.

II. Background
II(a) FIRB
Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board, otherwise known as the FIRB, is a
non-statutory body established in 1976 to advise the Treasurer and the Government on
Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy and its administration. Their role is to review
foreign investments and prevent any investment that may be against Australia’s national
interest (FIRB About). The FIRB will evaluate investments in business acquisitions,
agribusiness, media business, commercial and agricultural land, mining tenements, and
most importantly for the purposes of this study, real estate. Under the FIRB’s legislative
framework, a foreign national can only purchase new dwellings, and can only buy an
established dwelling under special circumstances. The purpose behind Australia’s
legislative framework is to channel foreign investments into new dwellings to create
additional jobs in the construction industry, increase government revenues from stamp
duties and other taxes, and increase Australia’s housing supply (FIRB About).
Individual foreign investment in real estate has been on the FIRB’s agenda since
the 1980s. Initially, in 1976, the FIRB did not consider real estate acquisitions by
foreigners. However, by 1982, purchases of real estate by foreign nationals came under
the FIRB’s authority. Through the 1960’s and 1970’s, Australia experienced its most
restrictive environment for business development. The Australian government has
5

recognized a 30 percent decline in capital productivity during that period due to the
restrictive nature of the regulatory environment. The restrictive setting was due to a wave
of economic nationalism that perceived foreign investment as a loss of sovereignty and
foreign acquisitions to mean a loss of jobs (Foreign Investment Policy in Australia). The
Australian government recognized these flaws in their self-harmful legislative framework
and sought to liberalize the system to encourage foreign investment. For example, in
1999 ‘Advanced-off-the-plan certificates’ were introduced, which allowed developers to
pre-approve the sale of up to 50 percent of development to foreign investors. In 2008,
temporary residents no longer needed FIRB approval to purchase real estate. However,
by 2009, sections of the housing industry were reporting increasing real estate prices
(Rogers Lee & Yan 2015). In result, following in 2010, the rising concerns of housing
affordability and the anti-foreign investment rhetoric in Australian media led to retightening of restrictions (Wong 2017).
The most recent legislation was announced in 2015 and was enforced at the
beginning of 2016 under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015 and
the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Regulation 2015. The new
legislation had three parts. One was to streamline the process for finding and prosecuting
violators of existing FIRB rules by putting all relevant information under one
organization, the Australian Tax Office. The second was to increase the penalties and
fines for violators, including jail time. The third was to impose an application fee for
foreign investors from A$5,000 to A$100,000. The new regulation also imposed a cap on
the amount an individual foreigner can purchase interests in “advanced off the plan”
developments to A$3 million, down from A$5 million.
6

II(b) Chinese Australian Economic Relations
Australia has been one of the many beneficiaries of China’s economic growth.
Since 2009, China has become an increasingly important trade partner for Australia. In
2013 to 2014, China accounted for roughly one-third of all export dollars in the fiscal
year and accounted for eighty percent export of dollar growth during the same period
(Australian Trade Commission 2015). In result, in December 2015, the Australian and
Chinese government announced the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, CHAFTA.
CHAFTA eliminated customs duties, incorporated non-tariff measures, and introduced
many other policies to encourage trade between the two nations (CHAFTA 2015).
China’s increased role in Australia’s export market along with CHAFTA have made
Australia more vulnerable to fluctuations in the Chinese market.
The link between shocks in the Chinese economy and the Australian economy has
been shown at the macroeconomic level. It has been shown that shocks to Chinese M2
have significance effects on the Australian economy (Burdekin & Tao 2016). For
instance, Australia avoided a technical recession because of China’s two-year fiscal
stimulus in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, and the ensuing slowdown in world
trade. China accelerated already existing infrastructure plans and built up a strategic
stockpile of raw materials. China’s increase demand for raw materials led to a boom for
Australian GDP, and without the increased stimulus, Australia would have experienced
three straight quarters of negative growth in real GDP (Day 2011).
As the link between the Chinese and Australian grew stronger, so has Chinese
immigration to Australia. For instance, more and more Chinese students are flocking to
7

Australian universities. In 2016, 196,315 Chinese students attended Australian
undergraduate and graduate institutions, representing approximately 27% of the
international population in Australia (Australian Government 2017). Chinese tourism has
experienced a similar trend. Chinese visitors increased from 100,000 in the year 2000 to
one million in January 2016, with an average annual growth rate of 18 percent since
2010. Chinese visitors spent A$ 1.5 billion in 2015 and spent A$7.7 billion in 2015. The
increase in Chinese tourism is not by accident. Australian tourism executives
aggressively target Chinese tourists through marketing, distribution, and partnership
strategies (Tourism Australia 2016). China’s growing economic ties are some of the
many reasons why Chinese nationals have increased their investment in Australian real
estate. (Rogers & Co 2015)

III. Empirical Approach:
The goal of this analysis is to test if the announcement of FIRB rule changes
affected the stock performance of relevant real estate development and
building/construction materials companies. To accomplish this, I utilize two empirical
processes, an event study, and an OLS regression, to determine if the rule changes
affected short-term and long-term returns.
I reason increased restrictions on foreign direct investment in real estate will
decrease construction activity in Australia. Such decreased construction activity would
hurt the top and bottom line growth for all real estate development and
construction/building material companies. Therefore, I hypothesize there will be a
negative spike in stock price returns for all Australian companies that have high
8

exposure to the real estate market relative to normal market returns, or negative longterm returns relative to normal market returns.
Method (A) Testing for Short-Term Effects on Returns
To test for short-term effects on Australian real estate development and
building/construction materials companies, I use an event study. An event study aims to
examine the impact of positive and negative news on investor reactions in the stock
market. Brown and Warner (1984) find event study results are consistent across altered
conditions like smaller samples and longer event periods. The efficient market
hypothesis states that at any given time and in a liquid market, security prices fully
reflect all available information (Morning Star 2017). Using the efficient market
hypothesis, the stock market is efficient enough to determine the impact of the FIRB
rules changes in relation to relevant corporations’ future earnings.
Specifically, in this thesis, an index of real estate development and
building/construction materials companies share price reactions in response to the FIRB
rule change was assessed. These reactions are measured through calculating the
abnormal returns relative to the Australian stock market while controlling for lagged
effects. In this study, to perform the regression for the distributed lag model, I need to
consider relevant construction companies and an index that reflect normal equity
performance in Australia. The index I use for market returns will be the All Ordinaries
Index. The All Ordinaries Index is the oldest index of shares in Australia and is made of
the 500 largest companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (S&P 2017). In
my regressions, I use two separately made indices that weight each stock by market cap
9

within the index. The two indices are a compilation of representative Australian real
estate development and building/construction materials companies. One index contains
the seven largest equities by market capitalization in the sector, and the other index
contains all relevant public companies. I reason that companies of different size have
different exposure to foreign direct investment, and the FIRB rule has different effects
on corporate profits.
This event study is performed through STATA in reference to Kim (2015). The
event dates assessed on May 2nd, 2015, the date of the rule change announcement. The
event window is the minimum number of observations before and after the event date and
the estimation window is the minimum number of observations before the event window.
In this thesis, event windows of ±1 and ±2 days and estimation windows of 15, 30, and
45 days were applied to the two indices to assess the immediate share price responses.
Before the abnormal returns analysis, it is necessary to estimate the normal
performance of the indices’ share price, which is completed through using a market
model that assumes a linear relationship between the daily returns of the index and the
All Ordinaries index. The equation is as follows:
Rft = αf + βfRmkt + eft
Where Rft is the daily return of the real estate development and construction materials
index at time t, αf is the intercept, βf is the coefficient of Rmkt which is the daily return of
the All Ordinary index, and eft is the error for the construction equity index.
Thus, the dependent variable in this model is the daily return of the index and the
independent variable is the daily return of the All Ordinaries index. The normal
10

benchmark performance is the return around the event window that would have followed
in the absence of any shift.
After estimating normal performance, abnormal returns are calculated by simply
subtracting the predicted normal return from the actual return for the dates within the
event window. The equation is as follows:
ARft = Rft - α̂f - β̂fRmkt
Then cumulative abnormal returns were computed by adding all the abnormal
returns for the index. Under the null hypothesis in which the event’s effects are
insignificant, the abnormal return should normally be determined with a zero conditional
mean and conditional variance. The significance of the abnormal returns is calculated by
dividing the cumulative abnormal return ΣARft by the standard deviation of ARft. The
statistical significance was determined at the 90%, 95%, and at the 99% level which
corresponds to absolute statistical values of 1.64, 1.96, and 2.58.
Method (B) Testing for Long-Term Effects on Returns
The event study method above looks at short-term changes in stock prices to see
the market reaction to different incidents. In this case, it is possible that the market does
not react rapidly to the information. Rather, the effect of a new policy or law can be
spread out over time. When looking at figures 1 through 10, there is a dip in stock price
for both indices and the individual securities examined in methodology 1. The dip in
stock price may be due to the lag in response of the stock market. I reason that the
existence of the longstanding FIRB and the pre-existing rules will not make investor
sentiment change. Only the new regulations could affect overall corporate earnings.
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Even, if the new FIRB rules did affect corporate earnings, then it’s effect could emerge
gradually over time, rather than immediately. To account for this possibility, I will
employ an ordinary least squares multivariate regression to determine whether an
association exists between the returns of a composite of real estate development
companies and the announcement and enforcement of new FIRB rule changes, when
controlling for returns of the overall Australian stock market returns. I regress four
separate indices that were used in the event study against the corresponding lag
dependent variables. Two of the four indices were re-used from method 1, and the other
indices were the first two indices removing Lend Lease Group, the largest real estate
development company in Australia. I remove Lend Lease Group because its size may
bias the results, as its returns will be weighted more than all other companies. The lags
are determined using the likelihood ratio test. I use the likelihood ratio test because it is
the most forgiving methodology for determining lags. I then use the All Ordinaries Index
as the proxy for normal market returns to see test if the effect of the new FIRB
regulations affected the market over time rather than in the window.
Using the methodology above and the simple Ordinary Least Squares regression,
the following econometric model is specified as:
Index Returnsi,t = β1 All Ordinariesi,t + β2 Index returnsi,t-1 + … + βn Index returnsi,t-n +
Dn + εi,t
Where Index returns represent the daily return of the composite of publicly traded
Australian real estate development companies, All Ordinaries represents the daily return
of the All Ordinaries Index, i.e., the daily return of the Australian stock market and the
12

lags represent the lag dependent variables determined by the likelihood ratio test. For the
dummy, I use it to account for any changes in return to the indices relative to the All
Ordinaries Index. I use three different regressions to run the dummy variable. One
dummy variable is “turned on” day of the announcement. I refer to this dummy as
dummy 1. The next regression, the dummy is “turned on” for a three-day “window”, the
day before the announcement, the day of the announcement, and the day after the
announcement. I refer to this dummy as dummy 2. In the last regression, the dummy is
“turned on” for perpetuity after the announcement. In the regression, I refer to this
dummy as dummy 3.
Since the FIRB rule changes not only include changes in foreign direct investment
in real estate but also in investment in other parts of the economy, it is possible that the
new rule changes will depress the entire market and not just the real estate sector. To
account for this, I will also run an OLS regression of the All Ordinaries index regressed
upon lags of its returns and the same dummy variables for the regressions mentioned
above. This regression will test if there is any effect on the market as a whole from the
aforementioned rule changes.

IV. Data
The daily returns of the four separate indices were all drawn from Capital IQ as
daily returns weighted by their market capitalization. The two event dates were assigned
based on the announcement of the event and the date that it had announced that the rules
were to be enforced.
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The two indices will be referred to as Index 1 and Index 2. In Index 1, the public
companies I include are Boral Limited (BLD), Stockland Corporation (SGP), LendLease
Group (LLC), CSR Limited (CSR), Mirvac Group (MGR), Adelaide Birghton (ABC),
Sunland Group (SDG), and Villa World (ltd). These equity companies are picked from a
list of the top residential homebuilders in Australia (Resolute Equipment 2016) and a list
of the top building and construction material companies in Australia (Barron’s 2017)
Index 2 is comprised of 14 different companies; the companies mentioned above and
AVJennings Limited (AVJ), Axiom Properties Limited (AXI), Brickworks Limited
(BKW), Cedar Woods Properties Limited (CWP), Devine Limited (DVN), Finbar Group
Limited (FRI), and Velocity Property Group Limited (VP7). These additional companies
are found using a Capital IQ screen. The criteria for the company are as follows; they
must be public companies, their primary source of revenue is through real estate
development or supplying construction materials, must be geographically based in
Australia, and must be listed on the ASX (Australian Stock Exchange).
Lend Lease Group (LLC), Sunland Group Limited (SDG), and Villa World Limited
(VLW) were specifically chosen because they were the three largest public real estate
development firms based on market capitalization in Australia. I exclude two larger
companies than SDG and VLW, Peet Limited (PPC) and Aveo Group (AOG). These
two companies are intentionally excluded because their main focus is the development
of retirement communities, and since this study’s focuses on residential real estate, they
were not seen as relevant companies for this analysis. Finally, BLD was added because
it was one of the largest building and construction material businesses in Australia, and
therefore would also be affected by a drop in construction activity.
14

Only selecting publicly traded firms limits the scope of the study. A 2016 study of
the top 10 construction firms by the value of contracts, the study included many
construction companies that are private and therefore cannot be included in the survey
(Resolute Equipment 2016). The limit on a number of companies that can be included in
this study leads to a restrained sample size. Although not possible, the study would be
greatly enhanced if data on the value of private firms was available.
The event date for the indices to be regressed upon is May 4th, 2015. The new rule
changes were announced on May 2nd, 2015 (Vendor Finance 2015). I select May 4th,
because May 2nd was a Saturday, and the first day Australian market could react to the
news would be the next closest trading day.
The regressions for method two are based on May 4th, 2015, for reasons mentioned
above, and December 1st, 2015. December 1st, 2015 is the date in which the FIRB
announced the new regulations were to be enforced (Vendor Finance 2015).

V. Results
Method (A) Testing for Short Term Effect on Returns
Tables 1.1 through 3.2 display my findings. The left-hand side of each table
displays which iteration of the model is run. An event date set at plus or minus one or two
days with either an event window of 15, 30, or 45 days creates six possible iterations per
index or stock. On the right-hand side are two columns, one of which is cumulat~n,
which stands for the cumulative abnormal return relative to the All Ordinaries Index. If
cumulat~n is positive, that means the index or stock had a positive abnormal return
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relative to the All Ordinaries Index, and if the value is negative, the index or stock had a
negative abnormal return. The next column contains the t test. A t-test assesses whether
the means of two groups are statistically different from each other. The statistical
significance was determined at the 90%, 95%, and at the 99% level which corresponds to
absolute statistical values of 1.64, 1.96, and 2.58.
Table 1.1 presents the findings for the six different iterations for my first basket of
stocks, which I refer to as index 1. Of the six, only one iteration produces significant
results at the 90% significance level, the 15-day estimation window set at plus or minus
two days. However, the significance is lost at the 30 and 45 window. The iteration
produces a positive result, which goes against my hypothesis. The positive return means
the market reacted positively to the FIRB rule changes.
Table 1.2 also presents the findings for index 2’s returns. The reaction for index
2’s return to the announcement of the FIRB rule change is assessed. As can be seen in
table 1.2, none of the iterations produced significant effects.
The findings of table 1.1 and 1.2 together suggest little to no correlation between
the change in the FIRB rules and the stock price performance of real estate development
and building material companies in Australia. Although there may have been a positive
effect on raw returns, the connection is weak at best. However, when the analysis was
decomposed into individual stock returns, results varied.
Table 2.1 shows the results for Lend Lease Group. As can be seen in Table 2.1
there are positive results at the 99% significant level for both event windows and at every
estimation window except for plus or minus one day, 30-day window, where it is at the
16

95% significance level. These results suggest a positive and significant effect of the FIRB
rule changes on the returns of the company. The results of Table 2.1 go against my
hypothesis, as results are positively significant. These results suggest that the investor
sentiment believed that the resulting rule changes would help the corporate profits of the
company.
However, when looking at other individual securities in tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4,
results are in line with my hypothesis. There is a negatively significant return at the 99%
significance window for Sunland Group (SGP) when the estimation windows are set at
plus or minus one day. Returns are negatively significant at the 99% significance for
every iteration except for the 45-day estimation window, where it is significant at the
95% significance level. Results for Villa World Limited (VLW) are statistically
significant only when set at plus or minus one day. In the 15-day estimation window, it is
significant at the 99% significance level and was significant at the 95% significance level
in the 30 and 45 day-estimation levels. However, when set at plus or minus one day,
results were insignificant. For Boral Limited (BLD), every iteration is negatively
significant when set at both plus or minus one and two days at the 99% significance level.
These results produce a clear negative boost on stock performance in relation to the All
Ordinaries index.
When looking at Mirvac Group (MRG), iterations are mixed but insignificant.
When looking at the plus or minus one-day event window, all iterations are positive and
insignificant. When the event window is widened to plus or minus two-day event
window, iterations remained insignificant, however, were now negative. As the most
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diversified company in my group, the results make sense that returns are insignificant
from the rest of the group.
After running the analysis on different individual public equities, I determine that
it is possible that the Lend Lease Group is simply an outlier. The Lend Lease Group is the
largest construction company by market capitalization. It also secures substantially more
building contracts than any other group in Australia. In 2015 alone, the Lend Lease group
secured A$4.9 billion in construction contracts, nearly double its next closest competitor,
who secured A$2.85 billion (Resolute Equipment 2016). Lend Lease Group’s size comes
with it geographic diversity, and it is projects in America, which may have protected it in
the eyes of investors from potential decreases in spending from Chinese nationals in
Australia (Lend Lease Group 2017). Regardless of the possible reasons for Lend Lease
Group’s positive returns and significance, its size causes it to have a high weight in the
indices, and therefore could be biasing the results upward. As a result, I remove Lend
Lease Group from the two indices and re-ran the event window. As can be seen in Table
3.1 and 3.2, without Lend Lease Group in the study, all results are still positive but results
remained insignificant at every iteration and additionally, the 15-day estimation window
set at plus or minus two days lost its significance.
For each security, returns could be wildly different from the returns of the All
Ordinaries index. However, once brought together as a whole, the returns of the real
estate development and building materials companies became more in line with the
index. The results could be interpreted in several different ways. One possible
explanation is investor sentiment did not change due to the announcement of regulations.
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They believed that the regulations would not affect total construction activity because
either foreign direct investment from Chinese nationals was not large enough to affect the
construction activity or the regulations were not robust enough to stem the tide of
investment. Therefore, the vast changes in the different individual securities are a result
of happenstance changes in microeconomic factors unrelated to the FIRB. As a result,
when evaluated as a whole, the returns of the entire sector fall in line with the returns of
the rest of the Australian equities market.
Another reason could be the changes in the FIRB affected individual securities
differently. The individual securities selected are not a representative sample, as shown
by the fact that I did not run a regression with each individual security in my index.
However, the companies that have significant results have different profiles. For instance,
Villa World Limited has a market capitalization around A$220 million, and Sunland
Group Limited has a market capitalization around A$200 million, whereas Lend Lease
Group market capitalization of 6.7 billion (Capital IQ 2017). These differences in market
capitalizations are due to the amount of construction, geographic diversity, and diversity
in different projects. This means the companies have varying abilities to react to changes
in rules to foreign direct investment. Each company’s individual exposure to Chinese
direct investment affects their stock price, and therefore, only companies with high
exposure should have their earnings decrease. If only a trivial amount companies have
high exposure, once indexed, those changes will be dispersed into normal market returns.
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Method (B) Testing for Long-Term Effect on Returns
Tables 4.1 through 5.3 display my results for the OLS regression. Each table
displays the results for each index and the All Ordinaries index, the t-statistic, and a pvalue. A t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different from
each other and p-value evaluates how well the sample data support the argument that the
null hypothesis is true. It measures how compatible my data is with the null hypothesis. A
high p-value means I accept the null and a low p-value means I reject the null. My null
hypothesis is that the FIRB rule changes were immediately priced in and there is no
effect on the market. As one can see in Tables 4.1 through 5.3, after running the OLS
regression on the separate indices to see if the FIRB rule changes had any lasting effect
on the market, I find no significant results for any of the dummies.
Table 6.1 and 6.2 examine the independent variable of the All Ordinaries Index in
each of the regressions. Each table displays the beta, t-stat, and p-value of the All
Ordinaries index. Beta value is a measure of how strongly each predictor variable
influences the criterion (dependent) variable, one can see the beta for the All Ordinaries
Index was typically very high, around .88 to 0.9, and it is always significant at either the
95% or 99% confidence level in all the regression. With a beta, so close to one and with
99% significance, although the real estate development and building materials equity
returns were down, the entire Australian equity market was also concurrently falling.
When looking at the All Ordinaries section in tables 4.1 through 5.3, the second
regression with all three dummy variables is not significant either. These results say the
Australian equity market did not react to either the announcement or the enforcement of
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the new FIRB rules. These results tell us that there is no lasting effect of the FIRB rule
changes on either the real estate development sector or the Australian equity market.

IV. Conclusion
This thesis aims to determine the share price reactions for the real estate
development and building/construction materials sector in Australia based on the rule
changes on foreign direct investment. By comparing the returns of a composite of
companies and individual securities to the returns of the overall Australian equities
market, this study finds that as a group, the Australian real estate development and
building/construction materials sector was not affected by the FIRB rule changes.
However, as individual securities, share price reactions are negative and significant for
many smaller real estate developers and one large building and construction material
company. These results are in line with my hypothesis that companies in that sector
would face negative reactions. One outlier company is Lend Lease Group, which
experienced positive and significant returns in relation to the All Ordinaries market. Lend
Lease Group’s positive returns go against my hypothesis and further research would be
required to identify why their returns are positive. Given more resources, an event study
of all different sectors within real estate, such as REITs would be regressed as well. Also,
event studies with securities placed into different buckets based on size, geographic
presence, diversity, and most importantly exposure to Chinese investment could be made
to see what type of real estate development companies were affected more by the rule
changes.
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The OLS regression of the Australian real estate development companies and
construction/building materials companies along with a regression of the All Ordinaries
Index against itself result in no significance. Therefore, there is no lasting effect of the
FIRB rule changes on the Australian equities markets. This suggests the FIRB rule
changes were priced into the Australian securities at the date of the announcement.
Overall, the results offer some support that the FIRB rule changes harmed
possibly smaller less diversified real estate development companies, but the overall
perception for the sector remained unchanged. The FIRB rule changes were not just
isolated to residential real estate and it is possible, because the beta for the All Ordinaries
Index is so high, the entire market was affected by the FIRB rule changes and therefore,
the market depressed as well, making differentiating the returns of the real estate
development sector and the overall equity market indistinguishable.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1.1
Index 1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
0.0217
1.3040
0.0200
1.1845
0.0234
1.3875
0.0405
1.6599*
0.0199
1.0363
0.0176
0.7789

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
0.0215
0.0194
0.0229
0.0399
0.0206
0.0176

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
0.0283
2.7448***
0.0238
2.5163***
0.0294
3.4381***
0.0784
4.6417***
0.0612
4.9512***
0.0601
7.4276***

Table 1.2
Index 2
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Table 2.1
Lend Lease Group (LLC)
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2

1.2765
1.1427
1.3430
1.6313
0.9113
0.7737
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Table 2.2
Sunland Group (SDG)
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
(0.0518) (12.2241)***
(0.0232) (28.3599)***
(0.0156)
(8.0618)***
(0.0514)
(2.9004)***
(0.0487)
(2.7921)***
(0.0467)
(2.15)**

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
(0.0535)
(2.902)***
(0.0473)
(2.3706)**
(0.0477)
(2.4185)**
(0.0322)
(0.9611)
(0.0193)
(0.5462)
(0.0201)
(0.5732)

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
(0.0640)
(7.6649)***
(0.0471)
(4.3927)***
(0.0407)
(4.9589)***
(0.0823)
(6.2272)***
(0.0684)
(7.3946)***
(0.0436)
(3.1379)***

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
0.0056
0.5912
0.0058
0.7331
0.0013
0.1784
(0.0091)
(1.2002)
(0.0049)
(0.5505)
(0.0091)
(1.2002)

Table 2.3
Villa World Limited
(VLW)
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Table 2.4
Boral Limited (BLD)
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Table 2.5
Mirvac Group (MGR)
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
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Table 3.1
Index1 - LLC
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
0.0174
0.0152
0.0173
0.0218
0.0040
0.0010

1.5199
0.9774
1.1311
1.0219
0.1759
0.0425

Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45
Estimation Window 15
Estimation Window 30
Estimation Window 45

Coef
t
cumulat~n
test
0.0174
0.0147
0.0169
0.0214
0.0039
0.0015

1.5062
0.9337
1.1071
0.9413
0.1646
0.0639

Table 3.2
Index2 - LLC
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -1/+1
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2
Event Window -2/+2

Table 4.1
Dummy 1
May 4th, 2015
Security/Index T-Stat
P-Value
Index 1
(0.66)
0.507
Index 2
(0.62)
0.534
Index 1 - LLC
(0.67)
0.506
Index 2 -LLC
(0.61)
0.540
All Ordinaries
(1.26)
0.210

Table 4.2
Dummy 2
May 4th, 2015
Security/Index T-Stat
P-Value
Index 1
1.14
0.254
Index 2
1.14
0.255
Index 1 - LLC
0.84
0.404
Index 2 -LLC
0.84
0.401
All Ordinaries
0.35
0.850

Table 4.3
Dummy 3
May 4th, 2015
Security/Index T-Stat
P-Value
Index 1
0.99
0.324
Index 2
0.96
0.338
Index 1 - LLC
1.17
0.244
Index 2 -LLC
1.13
0.260
All Ordinaries
0.22
0.828
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Table 5.1

Table 5.2

December 1st,
Dummy 1
2015
Security/Index T-Stat
P-Value
Index 1
1.42
0.507
Index 2
1.41
0.161
Index 1 - LLC
1.28
0.202
Index 2 -LLC
1.27
0.206
All Ordinaries
0.68
0.499

December 1st,
Dummy 2
2015
Security/Index T-Stat
P-Value
Index 1
0.90
0.371
Index 2
0.89
0.373
Index 1 - LLC
0.69
0.492
Index 2 -LLC
0.69
0.491
All Ordinaries
0.50
0.619

Table 5.3
December 1st,
Dummy 3
2015
Security/Index T-Stat
P-Value
Index 1
1.40
0.164
Index 2
1.36
0.174
Index 1 - LLC
0.21
1.270
Index 2 -LLC
1.23
0.221
All Ordinaries
1.59
0.112
Table 6.1
Significance of All Ordinaries May 4th, 2015
Index 1
Beta
T-Stat
P-Value
Dummy 1
1.000
16.71
0.000
Dummy 2
1.000
16.71
0.000
Dummy 3
0.998
16.59
0.000
Index 2
Dummy 1
Dummy 2
Dummy 3

Beta

T-Stat
P-Value
0.978
16.48
0.000
0.977
16.48
0.000
0.975
16.37
0.000

Index 1 - LLC
Dummy 1
Dummy 2
Dummy 3

Beta

T-Stat
P-Value
0.931
14.73
0.000
0.930
14.70
0.000
0.928
14.63
0.000

Index 2 -LLC
Dummy 1
Dummy 2
Dummy 3

Beta

T-Stat
P-Value
0.901
14.51
0.000
0.901
14.49
0.000
0.899
14.41
0.000

30

Table 6.2
Significance of All Ordinaries December 1st, 2015
Index 1
Beta
T-Stat
P-Value
Dummy 1
0.979
16.58
0.000
Dummy 2
0.986
16.74
0.000
Dummy 3
0.986
16.77
0.000

Index 2
Dummy 1
Dummy 2
Dummy 3

Beta

T-Stat
P-Value
0.962
16.47
0.000
0.970
16.64
0.000
0.968
16.67
0.000

Index 1 - LLC
Dummy 1
Dummy 2
Dummy 3

Beta

T-Stat
P-Value
0.902
15.07
0.000
0.908
15.23
0.000
0.907
15.25
0.000

Index 2 -LLC
Dummy 1
Dummy 2
Dummy 3

Beta

T-Stat
P-Value
0.882
15.00
0.000
0.888
15.15
0.000
0.887
15.17
0.000
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Figure 3

Index 1 ‐ LLC
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
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Figure 7
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Figure 9

Boral Limited
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Figure 10
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